What would it take to set up the browser to eliminate the likes of NSA from knowing much from their spying on their fellow Americans. Please invite the People like EFF.org to the table as well.

Finally, Please also include in Firefox a button that provides encryption with a push of that button. Apparently a free society requires transparancy in Government and Extremely Strong ENCRYPTION for every day communications.

Thanks, In advance.
GND

Regards: GND

In a technical sense the proposals are state-full. I would suggest to define initial state – the gray-list – from which to populate accept-lists and block-lists. I would also suggest to define default handlers for such a state. In a logical sense the state transition to accept or block are only two operations that may be validly performed on the initial state.
I foresee some real problems for the Advisory Board in defining this:
e.g:
Given the goals of the proposals the initial state should probably indicate blocking to at least certain level to be decided. Given that the fifth element (W3C on do-not-track) is not yet fully defined I fear there would be either double work or a premature definition.
In my opinion, the do-not-track filtering is probably the only mechanism that can perform a default filter on the gray-list with any kind of authority and is therefore essential to the proposal.
The presence or absence of the do-not-track indicator seems to be the only mechanism to perform default filtering with any kind of authority and this is not yet fully defined. The accept-list and block-list are in my opinion logically just derivatives of initial state. The default filter logically comes before them.
With this point I hope to demonstrate that there is a very high risk that the proposals are subject to the same frantic politics and debate as is the case with the do-not-track proposal in the first place. And that defeats at this moment in time the goals f the cookie clearing house.